Absenteeism under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act by Hickox, Stacy A.
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 50 
Issue 1 Fall 2000 Article 5 
Absenteeism under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
Stacy A. Hickox 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
Stacy A. Hickox, Absenteeism under the Family and Medical Leave Act and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act , 50 DePaul L. Rev. 183 (2000) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol50/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
ABSENTEEISM UNDER THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL
LEAVE ACT AND THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Stacy A. Hickox*
INTRODUCTION
Employers seeking to discipline their employees for absenteeism
must consider the restrictions imposed by the Family and Medical
Leave Act1 (FMLA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 2
(ADA). As the Presidential candidates discuss expanding the cover-
age of this protective legislation, it is important to understand the
scope of the protections that the FMLA and the ADA provide. In
particular, this legislation addresses the issue of determining the ap-
propriate times that an employer may legally discipline a chronically
absent employee. Employers typically chose to dismiss an employee
who does not report for work on a regular basis. The FMLA provides
protection for employees who take leave for a variety of reasons,
whereas the ADA protects disabled employees who take leave be-
cause of their disability. Although the FMLA was enacted to provide
greater protection for employees, courts have been reluctant to ac-
knowledge that discipline for absenteeism may infringe on the rights
of the employee who takes leave under the FMLA. Therefore, the
FMLA may fail to protect employees who are on leave if the em-
ployer's disciplinary action is justified by the employee's absenteeism.
The FMLA entitles eligible employees to a maximum of twelve
weeks of unpaid leave for health-related reasons.3 The purpose of the
FMLA is to "balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of
families," and "entitle employees to take reasonable leave for medical
reasons."' 4 Congress recognized that there was "inadequate job secur-
* Instructor, Legal Research, Writing and Advocacy at Michigan State University Detroit
College of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (1993). The Family and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L. No. 103-3, was en-
acted on February 5, 1993, with an effective date of August 5, 1993.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
3. Reasons for leave include an employee's own serious health condition that makes the em-
ployee unable to perform the functions of her position, and caring for a child, spouse, or parent
with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1995).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) & (2) (1994).
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ity for employees who ha[d] serious health conditions that prevent[ed]
them from working for temporary periods."' 5 The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that the FMLA was enacted to help working
men and women balance the conflicting demands of work and per-
sonal life, by recognizing that there will be times when an employee is
incapable of performing his or her duties because of medical reasons.6
The Senate Report on the FMLA states that the purpose of the
FMLA is to "help all businesses maintain a minimum floor of protec-
tion for their employees without jeopardizing or decreasing their com-
petitiveness, and to reduce the financial burden on the public sector,
which typically supports families which fail."7
To fulfill this purpose, the FMLA places certain restrictions on an
employer's treatment of employees who seek leave under the FMLA
provisions. The FMLA prohibits an employer from "interfer[ing]
with, restrain[ing], or deny[ing] the exercise of or the attempt to exer-
cise, any right provided" by the Act.8 The FMLA also prohibits an
employer from "discharg[ing] or in any other manner discriminat[ing]
against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful" by
the Act.9 Such discrimination includes taking action against employ-
ees because they have taken leave under the FMLA.10 An employer
may not consider leave covered by the FMLA as a negative factor in
employment decisions, such as hiring, promoting, or disciplining
employees.''
The ADA also protects individuals who miss work because of a
qualifying disability.' 2 Since the FMLA was not intended to limit pre-
5. 29 U.S.C. 2601(a)(4) (1994).
6. Price v. City of Fort Wayne, 117 F.3d 1022, 1024 (7th Cir. 1997).
7. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 18 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 20. A study conducted by
the Institute for Womens Policy Research estimated "that workers without leave suffer added
unemployment and earnings losses after childbirth or illness because they cannot return to their
former jobs" for total annual losses of $607 million (childbirth and adoption) and $12.2 billion
(serious illness). Id. Lack of such leave results in annual costs to taxpayers for "public programs
such as welfare, supplemental security income, and unemployment insurance," amounting to
$108 million (parental leave) and $4.3 billion (medical leave). Id.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (1994).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (1994).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (2000).
11. Id.
12. Disability is defined as having a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of [an individual's] major life activities," having "a record of such an impairment"
or "'being regarded as having such an impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(g) (1999). "Substantially limits" is defined as "significantly restricted in the ability to
perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the
average person having comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform a single,
particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working."
29 C.F.R. § 1630.20)(3) (1999). The associational discrimination provision of the ADA has a
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existing rights and protections, an employer must grant employees
leave under whichever statutory provision provides greater rights.' 3
The ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advance-
ment, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job train-
ing, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.' 14
Thus, an employer cannot discipline an employee for absenteeism
under the ADA, when the underlying reason for the discipline is the
employee's disability. Moreover, the ADA requires that employers
reasonably accommodate covered disabilities, often including disabili-
ties that cause absenteeism. 15
II. THE FMLA AND SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
Typically, an absent employee asserts a claim under the FMLA
when she is terminated because she never received approval for leave
under the FMLA or she is terminated for other alleged reasons during
approved leave. An employee is entitled to leave under the FMLA if
she is an eligible employee, 16 seeking leave for the birth or adoption
of a child, to care for a spouse, child, or parent with a serious medical
condition,17 or because of the employee's own serious medical condi-
tion that renders the employee unable to perform the functions of her
job.' 8 Eligible employees are entitled to unpaid leave of no more than
different definition for disabled, because employers are not required to accommodate nondis-
abled employees based on the disability of relatives or associates of the employee. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(4) (1999); 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630.20) app. at 349 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at
61-62 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 343-44.
13. See generally 29 C.F.R. § 825.702 (1999).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.4 (1999).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)(1994); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.9 (1999).
16. An eligible employee is one who has been employed for at least twelve months, for at
least 1,250 hours of service during that twelve months, and is employed at a worksite where fifty
or more employees are employed within a seventy-five mile radius. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2) (1994);
29 C.F.R. § 825.110(a) (1999). The definition of employee requires eligibility at the time the
employee requests leave, not at the time the employer takes adverse action. Duckworth v. Pratt
& Whitney, Inc., 152 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1998).
17. A serious medical condition is an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condi-
tion that involves inpatient care or subsequent treatment; continuing treatment for a period of
incapacity of more than three calendar days, two or more treatments, or pregnancy or prenatal
care; incapacity due to a chronic serious health condition or a condition for which treatment may
not be effective; or any period of absence to receive multiple treatments for a serious health
condition. 29 C.F.R. § 825.114 (1999).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a)(1)(1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.112 (1999). Inability to perform the func-
tions of the position is defined under the ADA and its regulations at 42 U.S.C. 12101 (1994), and
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n) (1999). 29 C.F.R. § 825.115 (1999). An employee who must be absent to
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twelve weeks during any twelve month period.' 9 An employee re-
turning from such leave must be reinstated to the same or equivalent
position.20
Employees asserting their right to leave under Title 29 of the
United States Code, section 2615(a)(1), enjoy a strict liability standard
when their employer denies a substantive right created by the
FMLA. 21 Since the FMLA creates substantive rights, an employer
cannot defend its denial of those rights by claiming that it has treated
all employees identically.22 An employee establishes a violation of
section 2615(a)(1) by proving through a preponderance of the evi-
dence that she is entitled to leave under the FMLA.23 Under this sec-
tion, the employer's intent is irrelevant. 24
A strict liability standard has been applied to analyze an employee's
claim that the employer wrongfully denied her request for additional
leave under section 2615(a)(1) of the FMLA.25 In Kaylor v. Fannin
Regional Hospital,26 the court adopted the strict liability standard
based on the presence of the word "shall" in section 2615(a)(1), the
inclusion of liquidated damages provisions for good faith violations,
and the FMLA's legislative history indicating that the act was adopted
receive medical treatment for a serious health condition is unable to perform the essential func-
tions of the position during that absence. Id.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.200 (1999).
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (1994); 29 C.F.R. § 825.215 (1999).
21. A plaintiff must still demonstrate that she possesses a statutory right, created affirmatively
by the provisions of the FMLA, that has been violated. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (1994). A plaintiff must
show that the leave is medically necessary for a serious health condition, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)
(1994), make a "reasonable effort to schedule the treatment so as not to disrupt unduly the
operations of the employer," 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(A) (1994), and give at least thirty days
notice to the employer when possible, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(2)(B) (1994).
22. Diaz v. Fort Wayne Foundry Corp., 131 F.3d 711, 712 (7th Cir. 1997).
23. Id. at 713; Haefling v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 169 F.3d 494, 499 (7th Cir. 1999). The
strict liability standard has been adopted in numerous cases. See Underhill v. Willamina Lumber
Co., No. 98-630-AS, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9722, at *12 (D. Ore. June 17, 1999) (adopting strict
enforcement of the "substantive provisions of the FMLA without regard to the employer's in-
tent"); Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable National Division, No. CIV.A.98-1460, 1999 WL 673062,
at *6 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 1999) (claim of interference with right to restoration to previous position
should not be analyzed under burden shifting analysis used in discrimination cases); Divizio v.
Elmwood Care, Inc., No. 97-C-8365, 1998 WL 292982, *1 (N.D. I11. May 28, 1998); Green v.
Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 97-1505, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16747 (W.D. Pa. July 27, 1998)
(finding employer's motive or intent is irrelevant when plaintiff asserts a violation of substantive
or prescriptive rights); Williams v. Shenango, Inc., 986 F.Supp. 309, 321 (W.D. Pa. 1997) (denying
motion for summary judgment because initial denial of request for leave and request that em-
ployee use a different week may constitute interference with rights under the FMLA).
24. Diaz, 131 F.3d at 713; Haefling, 169 F.3d at 499.
25. Kaylor v. Fannin Regional Hospital, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
26. Id.
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to "accommodate[ ] the important societal interest in assisting fami-
lies, by establishing a minimum labor standard for leave. '27
Under this strict liability standard, employers cannot rely on an ab-
senteeism prevention program to justify adverse action based on an
employee's use of leave under the FMLA. The regulations specifi-
cally provide that leave protected under the FMLA may not "be
counted under 'no-fault' attendance policies. ' 28 The impact of this
strict liability standard is illustrated by the finding of employer liabil-
ity in Butler v. Owens-Brockway Plastic Products, Inc.29
In Butler, the plaintiff was terminated after accumulating twelve
points under the employer's absenteeism program, and then calling in
sick while on probation.30 The employer's claim that the plaintiff was
terminated for violating her probation terms failed because the plain-
tiff was placed on probation based on both protected and non-pro-
tected absences. 31 The court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the finder of fact should determine
whether the plaintiff was terminated for protected or non-protected
absences.32
If an absence is protected under the FMLA, an adverse action
against the employee cannot survive under the strict liability standard.
In Victorelli v. Shadyside Hopsital,33 the court refused to uphold the
dismissal of an employee with a history of tardiness and absences who
was terminated after calling in sick one day.34 The Victorelli court
held that since the FMLA prevents employers from denying employ-
ment to employees once they return from leave and the plaintiff
would not have been terminated without that one absence, the trial
court should determine whether employment was terminated as result
of her serious health condition. 35
Some courts have found that disciplinary action based on leave
under the FMLA cannot stand, regardless of the other potential
grounds for that action. In Monica v. Nalco Chemical Co.,36 the court
reviewed the termination of an employee for six absences, including
27. Id. at 996-97 (citing S. REP. No. 103-3, at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6).
28. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (1999).
29. 199 F.3d 314, 317-18 (6th Cir. 1999).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 128 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 1997).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 191.
36. No. 96-1286, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19114, at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 26, 1996).
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one absence that the plaintiff applied for under the FMLA.37 The
court held that even though the defendant could have terminated the
plaintiff under its attendance policy after five absences, the employer
was not entitled to summary judgment where the plaintiff alleged that
the decision to terminate was based on the sixth protected absence.38
In Barnett v. Revere Smelting & Refining Corp.,39 the court relied on
the Monica decision in holding that where the terminated plaintiff
took leave protected under the FMLA and had unprotected absences,
the employer could not argue that the termination was based on the
other absences. The court reasoned that a termination based only in
part on an absence covered by the FMLA may still violate the act.40
Strict liability also prevents discipline of an employee for absences
where the employer has failed to fulfill its own obligations under the
FMLA. For example, under Title 29 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions, section 825.208(c), employers must designate leave as protected
by the FMLA within two business days of receiving notice of an em-
ployee's qualifying condition. If an employer fails to make such a des-
ignation, it may not retroactively designate leave as protected by the
FMLA. As a result, an employer cannot base an employee's termina-
tion on excessive absenteeism beyond the leave designated as pro-
tected under the FMLA. 41 Thus, an employer who fails to provide an
employee with her rights under the FMLA cannot base disciplinary
action on absenteeism which results from such a failure.
Past absenteeism on the part of the employee does not excuse an
employer's obligation to comply with the requirements of the FMLA.
In Mora v. Chem-Tronics, Inc.,42 the court held that the plaintiff's his-
tory of tardiness and absences over eight years of employment did not
provide the employer with sufficient grounds to believe that her re-
quest for leave for her son's illness was not related to a serious health
condition. 43 The court also held that the employer was not relieved of
its duty to investigate whether the illness triggered its obligations
under the FMLA, particularly when plaintiff named her son's illness
on the date in question. 44 The Mora court, citing Kaylor,45 relied on
the fact that the FMLA is a "strict liability statute in the sense that an
37. Id.
38. Id. at *6.
39. No. 98 Civ. 7307, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16347, (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 1999).
40. Id. at *22.
41. Viereck v. City of Gloucester City, 961 F. Supp. 703, 708 (D. N.J. 1997).
42. 16 F. Supp.2d 1192, 1215 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See supra note 26.
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employee need not delve into the employer's subjective intent to re-
cover for alleged violations for interference. '46
The impact of the strict liability standard on employers facing the
issue of employee absenteeism is mitigated by the notice and nondis-
ruption requirements imposed on employees seeking to use leave
under the FMLA. Regulations specifically provide that an employee
must give an employer at least thirty days advance notice if the need
for leave is foreseeable. 47 If such notice is not practicable, it must be
given "as soon as practicable," defined as within one to two business
days after the employee learns of the need for such leave. 48
The notice requirement seeks to lessen the burden on the employer
resulting from an employee's absenteeism. In Palazzolo v. Galen
Hospitals of Texas, Inc.,a9 the court, citing Kaylor, recognized that the
FMLA envisions a "cooperative effort between the employer and em-
ployee to ensure that the employee gets leave necessary for medical
treatment while not unduly disrupting the employer's operations.1 50
In the case of non-emergency treatment which could "disrupt the op-
eration of the business, the FMLA makes the employer's staffing is-
sues the employee's problem. '51 If an employee disregards the effects
of her absence on her employer, then the employer can discipline the
employee for taking leave, even if the leave otherwise qualifies under
the FMLA.52
An employee whose health condition prevents her regular attend-
ance cannot necessarily assert a claim for strict liability based on the
employer's failure to reinstate her. The regulations specifically pro-
vide that if an employee is unable to perform an essential function of a
position because of her condition, the employee does not have a right
of restoration to another position under the FMLA. 53 Thus, an em-
ployee seeking reinstatement must establish her ability to perform the
work required of the position. Where an employee is not capable of
returning to her position at the end of her twelve weeks of leave, even
46. Id. at 1219 (citing Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996)). See also Williams v. Rubicon,
Inc., No. 98CA1743, 1999 WL 777761, *4 (Ct. App. La., 1st Cir. Sept. 24, 1999)(failing to restore
plaintiff to former position following leave and failing to request medical certification regarding
inability to work should not be analyzed under discrimination framework, and plaintiff is not
required to show employer's intent to retaliate).
47. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a) (1999).
48. Id.
49. No. l:96-CV-2550-TWT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21915 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 1997) (citing
Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996)).
50. Id. at *15.
51. Id. at *16-17.
52. Id.
53. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b) (2000).
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if the extended absence is due to the same medical condition, her em-
ployer does not have a duty of reinstatement.5 4 If the employee re-
turns to work, but cannot attend work on a regular basis in a position
that requires regular attendance, that employee is not entitled to rein-
statement under the FMLA.55 Since extended hours may qualify as
an essential function of a position, many courts will find that an em-
ployee who is unable to work such hours fails to perform an essential
function of the position and, thus, does not have a right to
reinstatement. 56
Under some circumstances, the employer may have a duty to rein-
state if the employee seeks to return to work in a light duty capacity.
In Harrison v. Landis Plastics, Inc.,57 the court distinguished the hold-
ing in Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon,58 wherein the
plaintiff was unable to perform any work, finding that the employer
had a duty to reinstate the plaintiff returning from leave under the
FMLA if she was able to work as an inspector-packer at its plastic
container manufacturing plant with reasonable accommodation. 59 A
return to light duty is particularly appropriate where the employee has
performed light duty work in the past.60
Even if the employer can show that the employee would not have
returned to work after taking leave under the FMLA, the employee
may still recover damages if the employer terminated her employment
because of that leave. In Rogers v. AC Humko Corp.,61 for example,
the court denied the plaintiff's claim for back pay because of her pre-
vious inability to work, but furthered the FMLA's goal of deterrence
by ordering that the employer either reinstate the plaintiff to her same
54. Green v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., No. 98-3775, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 30158, at *4-5 (6th
Cir. Nov. t6, 1999); Beckendorf v. Schwegmann Giant Super Markets, Inc., No. 95-3822, 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5693, at *11 (E.D. La. April 18, 1997), affd 134 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 1997). See
also Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95 C 3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495,
at *27 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997); Stopka v. Alliance of Am. Insurers, No. 95C7487, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 18329, at *23 (N.D. Il. Dec. 6, 1996), affd 141 F.3d 681 (7th Cir. 1998).
55. Warren v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 3:97-CV-1030-R, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12849, at *13
(N.D. Tex. Aug. 13, 1999).
56. Tardie v. Rehabilitation Hosp. of Rhode Island, 168 F.3d 538, 543-44 (1st Cir. 1999). The
employer can also argue that the employee would otherwise not be entitled to reinstatement.
O'Connor v. PCA Family Health Plan, Inc., Nos. 97-5879, 98-5121, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 608,
at *4 (11 th Cir. Jan. 18, 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.216(a)(1999) and stating that "[an em-
ployer must be able to show that an employee would not otherwise have been employed at the
time reinstatement is requested, in order to deny restoration of employment").
57. No. 97 C 7094, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11311 (N.D. Il. July 22, 1998).
58. No. 95 C 3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495, at *27 (N.D. II. Feb. 7, 1997).
59. Harrison, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11311, at *26.
60. Id.
61. 56 F. Supp.2d 972 (W.D. Tenn. 1999).
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position or an equivalent position, or offer front pay to the plaintiff.
62
Courts which follow a line of reasoning founded on the goal of deter-
rence offer a more forceful protection of the rights that Congress in-
tended the FMLA to provide.
Under the substantive rights section of the FMLA, an employee en-
joys a strict liability standard which entitles her to relief if the em-
ployer denies her any rights to which she is entitled under the act.
The employee who is absent from work, and then disciplined or dis-
missed for that absence, can recover if the court deems that the ab-
sence should have been treated as leave covered by the FMLA. Some
employers comply with the substantive requirements of the FMLA,
and properly treat absences as leave under the act, but continue to
discipline an employee for her absences from work. In such situa-
tions, the employee must turn to the discrimination provision of the
FMLA for possible relief.
III. DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE FMLA
An absent employee typically asserts a claim of discrimination when
she suffers an adverse employment action after taking leave under the
FMLA. Courts have analyzed such claims of discrimination under
section 2615(a)(2) of the FMLA, while using the burden-shifting anal-
ysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.63 Section 105(a)(2)
makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge, or in any other man-
ner discriminate against, any individual for opposing any practice
made unlawful by the FMLA. This "opposition" clause is derived
from Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,64 and is intended to be
construed in the same manner.65
Congress adopted Title VII's McDonnell Douglas test to "most ac-
curately balance providing employees a broader basis for proving an
employer violated the FMLA while also protecting the interests of
employers. ' 66 Adoption of this well-established test also serves to
place claims of discrimination under the FMLA within the well-settled
rubric of law governing discrimination claims under Title VII and
other labor laws, thereby ensuring uniformity in analyzing discrimina-
tion in the workplace. 67 Although courts are familiar with the Mc-
62. Id. at 978-79.
63. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
64. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3(a) (1994).
65. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 34 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 20, 36 (quoting McDonnell
Douglas, 411 U.S. at 796).
66. Kaylor, 946 F. Supp. at 1000.
67. Id.
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Donnell Douglas test in general, their application of the test in cases
that enforce the FMLA varies somewhat from the approach that has
been adopted under Title VII.
In accordance with the legislative intent, courts reviewing adverse
actions taken against employees who have asserted rights under the
FMLA consistently apply the McDonnell Douglas balancing test.68
This balancing test allocates the burdens of production and persuasion
in a three step process, placing the ultimate burden of proving dis-
crimination on the plaintiff.69 Under the McDonnell Douglas test, the
plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that she is pro-
tected by the FMLA, that the employer took adverse action against
her, and that a causal link exists between the employee's participation
in the protected activity and the adverse employment action, or that
she was treated less favorably than an employee who had not asserted
rights under the FMLA.70 After such a showing, the employer can
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse ac-
tion, and the plaintiff then has the opportunity, and the burden, to
demonstrate that the legitimate explanations offered by the defendant
were a pretext for discrimination. 7'
In a discrimination case under the FMLA, proof of a prima facie
case typically turns on the establishment of a causal link between the
employee taking leave under the FMLA and the employer's adverse
action in response. The employee may establish such a link with evi-
dence that the exercise of her rights under the FMLA was a motivat-
ing or determining factor in the adverse employment action.72 The
causal link may be demonstrated by showing that the employer would
not have taken the adverse action "but for" the employee's protected
activity. 73
For example, in Routes v. Henderson,74 the court found such a link
based on evidence of a negative attitude toward the plaintiff which
68. See Chaffin v. John H. Carter Co., Inc., 179 F.3d 316, 319-20 (5th Cir. 1999); Graham v.
State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., 193 F.3d 1274, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999); King v. Preferred Technical
Group, 166 F.3d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1999); Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 161
(lst Cir. 1998); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997); Long v. Eastfield
College, 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996); Leary v. Hobet Mining Co., 981 F. Supp. 452 (S.D.
W.Va. 1997).
69. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04.
70. Id. at 802; King, 166 F.3d at 892; Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 161. See also Texas Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53 (1981).
71. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-04; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-57.
72. Hodgens, 144 F.3d at 160; Hypes, 134 F.3d at 726.
73. King, 166 F.3d at 892; Routes v. Henderson, 58 F. Supp.2d 959, 979 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
74. 58 F. Supp.2d 959 (S.D. Ind. 1999).
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developed after he took leave under the FMLA.75 The plaintiff does
not need to prove that his protected activity was the sole factor in
motivating the employer's adverse action to establish a causal link.
76
Such a causal link can be established by the "temporal proximity" be-
tween an employee's protected leave and her termination. 77
In Voorhees v. Time Warner Cable National Division,78 a causal con-
nection was established by the close time between the plaintiff's leave
under the FMLA and the subsequent reduction of job responsibilities
and other changes which lead to her dismissal.79 Courts vary as to
whether the mere fact that the employee was terminated while on
leave under the FMLA sufficiently establishes a causal connection.
80
The causal link may be established based on a lack of justification
for the employer's action against the employee who has taken leave
under the FMLA. For example, in Bryant v. Delbar Products, Inc.,81
the court held that the employee established a causal link where her
employer offered no reason for her termination other than absentee-
ism.82 Despite the violation of her employer's absenteeism policy,
which allowed for termination based on eight attendance "occur-
rences" in one year, the court found a causal connection because at
least one of the plaintiff's occurrences resulted from leave for her
son's illness which qualified under the FMLA. 83
In contrast to the court's recognition of a causal connection in Bry-
ant, in Dodgens v. Kent Manufacturing Co.,84 the court refused to find
a causal connection between the plaintiff's termination and his leave
taken under the FMLA, where the plaintiff had taken fifteen leaves of
absence in twenty-two years of employment.85 The plaintiff, a shift
75. Id. at 989.
76. Sherrod v. American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir. 1998).
77. King, 166 F.3d at 893. See also Trujillo-Cummings v. Public Service Co. of New Mexico,
No. 97-2337, 1999 WL 169336, at *2, reported in table, 173 F.3d 864 (10th Cir. March 29, 1999)
(citing Marx v. Schnuck Markets, 78 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir. 1996) and finding causal connection
shown by inferences stemming from protected conduct closely followed by adverse action); Mc-
Clendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789. 796-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting "close temporal
connection . . . is generally enough to satisfy [causal connection requirement]").
78. No. CIV.A.98-1460, 1999 WL 673062 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 1999).
79. Id. at *6.
80. See, e.g., Henthorn v. Olsten Corp., No. 97-C-50182, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2029 (N.D. Ill.
Feb. 24, 1999) (sufficient); Dean v. Methodist Hosps. of Dallas, No. 3:97-CV-2431-P, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 18573, at *22 n. 11 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 23, 1998) (insufficient); Urbano v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., No. H-95-3508, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20412, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 1, 1996), affd,
138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (insufficient).
81. 18 F. Supp.2d 799 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
82. Id. at 809.
83. Id.
84. 955 F. Supp. 560 (D.S.C. 1997).
85. Id. at 566.
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supervisor in his employer's drawing department, had most recently
taken medical leave for knee surgery. 86 The court weighed heavily the
fact that his employer had granted 129 leaves of absence to other em-
ployees under the FMLA, and had reinstated each of those employ-
ees.87 Thus, courts are willing to allow dismissals which are not
protected by the FMLA to defeat an absent employee's establishment
of the requisite causal connection.
An absent employee may not be able to establish such a causal con-
nection even where the reason given for her dismissal is unacceptable
attendance, and includes references to her leave under the FMLA. In
Summerville v. Esco Co.,88 the court held that such a reference does
not establish a causal connection because the absent employee's dis-
missal letter simply pointed to the previous memorandum which refer-
enced his leave under the FMLA as an example of the plaintiff's
attendance problems.89 The Summerville court failed to consider the
employer's actual intent by relying on the fact that neither the letter,
nor the testimony of defendant's decision-makers, stated that plain-
tiff's leave under the FMLA was the reason for termination. 90
Similarly, in Enright v. CGH Medical Center,91 the court held that
despite reference to leave under the FMLA in the supervisor's notes,
the employee did not establish a causal connection even where the
counseling statement to plaintiff specifically referenced unplanned ab-
sences. 92 After the issuance of the counseling statement, the plain-
tiff's hours were reduced to part-time and a short time later she was
suspended, in part, for unplanned absences. 93 Since the supervisor's
testimony and notes indicated that the employer disciplined the plain-
tiff for unplanned sick days, and not for leave that was protected
under the FMLA, the court refused to find that her supervisor had
considered the protected absences.94 The court noted its reluctance to
sit as "a super-personnel department" by allowing the plaintiff to base
her discrimination claim on nothing more than a possible miscalcula-
tion of leave taken by her supervisor. 95
86. Id. at 563.
87. Id. at 566.
88. 52 F. Supp.2d 804, 812-14 (W.D. Mich. 1999).
89. I. at 812-14.
90. Id.
91. No. 96-C-50224, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 370 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1999).
92. Id. at *4-5.
93. Id.
94. Id. at *11.
95. Id.
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Employees find it difficult to establish a causal connection when
their employer can rely on unprotected absences. Similar to the court
in Enright, in Boriski v. City of College Station,96 the court dismissed
an employee's claim for lack of a causal connection. 97 The court held
that the plaintiff's subjective belief that her employer engaged in re-
taliation was insufficient, where her employer had begun disciplining
and harassing the plaintiff about her attendance problems before she
took leave under the FMLA.98 Thus, the court refused to find a
causal connection, even though the plaintiff was dismissed shortly af-
ter taking the protected leave. 99
When an employee takes leave under the FMLA and is later disci-
plined, she may be unable to establish a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation even if the discipline is based on her absenteeism. If that
employee has a history of absences beyond leave that is protected by
the FMLA, and in line with the company's own absenteeism policy the
employer is careful to base the discipline on only unprotected ab-
sences, the plaintiff may be unable to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination.
Even if the employee who has taken leave under the FMLA estab-
lishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the employer may still rely
upon her absenteeism as a justification for discipline. In applying the
McDonnell Douglas test, courts have consistently accepted excessive
absenteeism as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse ac-
tion taken against an employee who has asserted rights under the
FMLA. In Morgan v. Hilti, Inc.,100 the court held that the employer
did not retaliate by giving the plaintiff a letter of discipline on the day
she returned from leave under the FMLA, where the employer of-
fered the reason of excessive absenteeism and the plaintiff offered "no
evidence that [the employer] was not actually concerned about her
attendance.'' The Morgan court failed to consider that leave under
the FMLA may have been considered as part of the attendance
problems.
Excessive absenteeism was also accepted as justification for disci-
pline by the court in Hypes v. First Commerce Corp.'02 In Hypes, the
plaintiff missed nine full days and seventeen half days of work in a
four month period after the employer denied his request for a later
96. 65 F. Supp.2d 493 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
97. Id. at 514.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997).
101. Id. at 1325.
102. 134 F.3d 721 (5th Cir. 1998).
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start time."13 The court accepted the employer's reason for the plain-
tiff's termination without considering that the plaintiff's absences,
which were protected under the FMLA, may have entered into that
decision. 0 4 Courts are particularly inclined to find that the employer
has offered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination
where the plaintiff gave no indication when she would be able to re-
turn to work, and failed to return to work even at the end of her leave
protected under the FMLA. 10 5
However, some courts will not consider the employee's leave pro-
tected by the FMLA as justification for taking an adverse action
against the employee, regardless of whether the employer actually
considered that protected leave at the time such action was taken. In
Bailey v. Amsted Indus., Inc. ,106 the court held that since the majority
of the employee's absences were not protected by the FMLA, there
were sufficient absences to justify his discharge and there was no dis-
crimination. 0 7 The court found that an employee cannot claim pro-
tection under the FMLA for disciplinary action which results from
absences that are not attributable to his serious health conditions. 10 8
In Summerville, the court similarly concluded that the plaintiff's six-
teen absences in one year, which were not protected by the FMLA,
were a legitimate reason for his dismissal. 0 9 The court also found that
the employer's reassignment of the plaintiff was for legitimate busi-
ness reasons because he had pre-approved protected absences for a
bone spur and he indicated that he was not planning to undergo sur-
gery to improve the potentially debilitating medical condition. 10
Therefore, it was reasonable for the employer to reassign the em-
ployee in order to accommodate the "substantial possibility that the
plaintiff would require leave for his bone spur again."' I These deci-
sions only examine the absences that were not protected by the
103. Id. at 725.
104. Id. at 726. See also Holmes v. Boeing Co., No. 96-1424-JTM, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2504, at *9 (D. Kan. Feb. 3, 1998) (accepting excessive absenteeism as a legitimate non-discrimi-
natory reason for discharge without finding that absences were not part of FMLA leave). On
appeal, the 10" Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court properly analyzed plain-
tiff's claim of retaliation under the Morgan v. Hilti test, because the plaintiff failed to offer
evidence that the reasons for discharge, excessive absenteeism, and failure to follow instructions
when absent, were pretextual. Holmes v. Boeing Co., No. 98-3056, 1999 US App. LEXIS 377, at
*8 (10th Cir. Jan. 12, 1999).
105. Voorhees, 1999 WL 673062, at *7.
106. 172 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 1999).
117. Id. at 1045.
108. Id. at 1045-46.
109. Summerville, 52 F. Supp.2d 804 at 813.
110. Id. at 816.
111. Id.
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FMLA for justification of disciplinary action, and refused to base lia-
bility on the possibility that the employer may have also considered
the leave protected by the FMLA in deciding to impose discipline on
the absent employee.
Other courts have refused to accept an employer's justification for
its adverse action against an employee where it might include leave
protected by the FMLA. For example, in Brice-Northard v. Sports
Authority,112 the court denied an employer's motion for summary
judgment based on genuine issues of material fact concerning whether
the plaintiff's leave under the FMLA was used in calculating her over-
all performance score.113
Similarly, in Williams v. Shenango, Inc.," 4 the court upheld the dis-
crimination claim of an employee who was suspended and later given
a last chance agreement for excessive absenteeism and leaving work
without relief, after taking leave for his wife's surgery. 1 5 The plaintiff
was later terminated for an unprotected absence. The court denied
the employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff's
leave under the FMLA was included for calculation purposes in the
employer's decision to suspend the plaintiff. 16 Rejecting the em-
ployer's argument that the plaintiff had enough unprotected absences
to justify suspension, the court held that "the very inclusion of the
perhaps FMLA-protected absence on a discipline record could lead
reasonable persons to conclude that [the plaintiff] was being retaliated
against for exercising FMLA rights."' 1 7 Thus, where the courts have
treated the employer's inclusion of leave that is protected by the
FMLA in its justification for an employee's discipline as evidence of
discrimination, the purposes of the FMLA are advanced.
More savvy employers rely on absenteeism policies or collective
bargaining agreements to establish the legitimacy of their decision to
discipline an absent employee. Employers are sometimes successful
in this reliance, despite the admonition in the Department of Labor's
regulations that protected leave may not "be counted under 'no-fault'
112. No. 97-7275, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20408 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 1998).
113. Id. at *11. See also Henthorn v. Oisten Corp., No. 97-C-50182, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2029, at *17 (N.D. I11. Feb. 24, 1999) (denying the employer's motion for summary judgment
where reasons given for termination were her leave of absence and failure to provide necessary
certification for that leave).
114. 986 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
115. Id. at 322.
116. Id. at 321-22.
117. Id. at 321 (emphasis added). See also Austin v. Haaker, No. 98-2283-GTV, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 19148, at *25 (D. Kan. Nov. 24, 1999) (finding retaliation by employer where sus-
pension and last chance agreement shortly followed leave and agreement stated that he had used
all of his leave allowed by the FMLA).
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attendance policies."' 18 An employer can establish a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason based on its collective bargaining agreement,
which states that "an employee could be terminated automatically in
the event that an employee did not return to work at the expiration of
a leave of absence or did not request and receive an extension of the
leave of absence."'"19
In McCown v. UOP, Inc.,120 one of the first cases interpreting the
FMLA, the court denied a claim of discrimination where the plaintiff
took nine personal days and ten sick days in one year, prior to the
enactment of the FMLA, and then left work early three days a week
under the FMLA. 121 Although the employer did not establish a spe-
cific limit on the use of paid leave, the court held that the employer
did not discriminate because the plaintiff failed to meet her burden of
establishing "legitimate expectations."' 122 This perceived failure was
based in part on the frequency of plaintiff's absences, given the em-
ployer's policy in its employee handbook which stated that excessive
absences could result in termination. 123 The court held that
"[r]equiring an employee to limit the number of days she misses work
is objectively reasonable. Moreover, expecting an employee to limit
her absences after warning her that the employer considers them ex-
cessive is equally reasonable."' 124
The McCown court held that sending a warning memorandum to
the plaintiff shortly after she requested leave under the FMLA was
not enough to show discrimination, because "[t]he FMLA is not a
shield to protect employees from legitimate disciplinary action by
their employers if their performance is lacking in some manner unre-
lated to their FMLA leave."125 Given the employer's interest in limit-
ing an employee's absences, the McCown court failed to consider that
the plaintiff's absences, which were protected under the FMLA, may
have entered into the employer's decision to dismiss the employee
who requested protected leave.
Since the McCown decision, some courts have recognized that an
employer cannot blindly rely on its own attendance policies in taking
adverse action against an employee who has taken leave under the
118. 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(c) (1999).
119. King, 166 F.3d at 893.
120. No. 94-C-2179, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12655, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 30, 1995).
121. Id. at *8.
122. Id. at *2, 18-19.
123. Id. at *19.
124. Id. at *19-20.
125. Id. at *20.
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FMLA. In George v. Associated Stationers,126 the court held that even
where the employer's policy provided that an employee's seventh ab-
sence could result in termination, the plaintiff was wrongfully termi-
nated because his seventh absence resulted from a medical condition
that qualified under the FMLA. 127 The court held that the company's
policy for the calculation of "occurrences," and disciplinary actions
flowing from such calculations, cannot be applied to decrease an em-
ployee's rights under the FMLA. 128 Furthermore, an attendance pol-
icy which does not except as an "occurrence" an absence caused by a
serious medical condition violates the FMLA.129
An employer may have difficulty establishing a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for disciplining an employee who has taken leave
under the FMLA if that leave is included as a reason for the disci-
pline, or if the employer failed to adhere to its own policies and proce-
dures on absenteeism. Even if the employer advances a legitimate
reason for the discipline, the employee can argue that the reason
given was a pretext for discrimination based on the invocation of her
rights under the FMLA.
Guidelines for proving pretext in the FMLA cases have been bor-
rowed from other discrimination statutes. In the Title VII context,
pretext can be shown by "'such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsis-
tencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could ra-
tionally find them unworthy of credence and hence infer that the em-
ployer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons." ' 130
The employee carries the burden of proving a violation of the stat-
ute.131 Proof of pretext may have evidentiary value, but is neither
necessary nor sufficient to a finding of liability. 132
An employee protected by the FMLA may demonstrate pretext by
showing that the employer's stated reasons were false, and that dis-
crimination was the real reason behind the adverse employment deci-
sion.' 33 In King v. Preferred Technical Group,'34 the court found that
the plaintiff met this burden with evidence that the human resources
126. 932 F. Supp. 1012 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
127. Id. at 1017-18.
128. Id. at 1017.
129. Id.
130. Olson v. General Elec. Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996) (quoting Fuentes
v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)).
131. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993).
132. Id.
133. King v. Preferred Technical Group, 166 F.3d 887, 893 (7th Cir. 1999).
134. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
manager told the plaintiff that she could not return to work without
missing leave slips, and that the manager did not tell plaintiff that she
needed an extension of leave to avoid termination. 35 Thus, if the em-
ployer's reasons for discipline are unsupported by its own evidence,
the employee may be able to establish that those reasons were
pretextual.
An employer's reasons for an adverse action may be pretextual if
leave that is protected under the FMLA is included in the calculation,
or if the adverse action shortly follows the request for leave under the
FMLA. 36 Although the plaintiff "may indeed have escaped disci-
pline for several rules infractions prior to his taking FMLA leave, it
may be significant that the 'avoidance of discipline' ended shortly af-
ter his taken FMLA leave."' 137
In Miller v. Galen of Florida,138 the plaintiff established pretext be-
cause her medical condition constituted a serious health condition
under the FMLA and she provided adequate notice of leave to her
employer. 39 The court held that the employer's reason of excessive
absenteeism was not legitimate because the absenteeism was arguably
protected by the FMLA and, as a result, was arguably pretextual. 140
Similarly, in Sharpe v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.,141 the court
granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment because her em-
ployer considered leave under the FMLA when taking adverse action
against her.142 MCI failed to offer evidence that it made a distinction
between absences protected by the FMLA and other unprotected ab-
sences. 43 Courts recognize that when an employer has considered
protected leave in making its decision to take adverse action against
an employee with a history of absenteeism, that adverse action contra-
venes the protective and deterrent purposes of the FMLA.
An employee may be able to show pretext even if, on its face, the
employer's reason for adverse action does not potentially include
leave under the FMLA. Genuine issues of fact may exist as to
whether the employer's reasons for termination were a pretext for dis-
crimination. For example, in Williamson v. Miss. Dep't of Human
135. Id. at 894.
136. Williams, 986 F.Supp. at 322.
137. Id.
138. No. 96-248-CIV-T-17-E, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17901 (M.D. Fla. June 19, 1997).
139. Id. at *14-15.
140. Id. at *21.
141. 19 F. Supp.2d 483 (E.D.N.C. 1998).
142. Id. at 490.
143. Id.
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Serv.,'14 4 the plaintiff was terminated for insubordination and for leav-
ing work without obtaining replacements; however, she offered evi-
dence that she had permission to leave work and did obtain
replacements. 45 The court recognized that an employer may still be
held liable "if a motivating factor of its decision was also the plaintiff's
taking of FMLA leave."' 146 Similarly, in Henthorn v. Olsten Corp.,1 47
the court found evidence of pretext where an employer articulated
poor performance as its reason for the plaintiff's discharge, but the
employer's letter of discharge referenced her medical leave as one
reason for the discharge. 148
Courts reviewing claims brought under the FMLA seem disinclined
to accept attacks on the legitimacy of the employer's reason for an
adverse action if arguably unrelated to the employee's leave under the
FMLA, even though the employer may have referred negatively to
such leave. Even where the court recognizes that the employer's mo-
tive is the relevant issue, courts are reluctant to recognize an illegal
motive if the employer provides unrelated grounds for the discipline.
Courts are particularly willing to accept such reasons where the em-
ployer's legitimate non-discriminatory reason, namely plaintiff's per-
formance and the employer's reorganization needs, preceded medical
leave. 149 Even though, in Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp.,' 50 the
court recognized that an employer cannot use such a legitimate reason
to "get rid of workers who exercise their FMLA right[s]," the court
rejected the pretext argument which was based on the supervisor's
references to excessive absences after the employee's leave under the
FMLA and consideration of his absenteeism in his low performance
rating.15 1 The employee had both absences that were protected under
the FMLA and unprotected absences.152 However, the court found
that the "vast majority" of the plaintiff's absences were not medically
necessary and, therefore, references to his absenteeism in general did
not establish pretext.153
Just as the Hodgens court refused to consider the employee's ab-
sences that were protected by the FMLA as evidence of pretext, in
144. No. 3:96CV160-0-D, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9968 (N.D. Miss. April 29, 1997).
145. Id.
146. Id. at *7.
147. No. 97 C S 0182, 1999 WL 102764 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 24, 1999).
148. Id. at *6.
149. Hodgens v. General Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 170-72.
153. Id. at 172.
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Bond v. Sterling, Inc.,'1 5 4 the court relied on the employer's reasons for
dismissal without considering its close relationship to the plaintiff's
leave under the FMLA.155 The Bond court accepted the plaintiff's
failure to attend a mandatory manager's meeting as a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for her dismissal, despite the fact that the meet-
ing occurred during her leave under the FMLA, but after she was
cleared by her physician to return to work. 156 The court held that the
plaintiff failed to show that the employer's meeting requirement was
not legitimate and that she was fired for a reason other than not at-
tending the meeting. 157 However, the court failed to recognize that
exercising one's right to leave under the FMLA sometimes necessi-
tates missing job functions.1 58 Allegations of the proximity between
the plaintiff's return from leave and her termination, and her supervi-
sor's statement that "we are not a family oriented company, we are a
business," were not enough to show pretext. 159
Unlike a typical Title VII case, even blatant statements of hostility
regarding the employee's protected leave activity may not be enough
to establish pretext under the FMLA. In McGarity v. Mary Kay Cos-
metics,160 the court reviewed a claim of discriminatory discharge under
the McDonnell Douglas test.' 6 1 However, the court found that state-
ments made by the plaintiff's supervisor, expressing his disapproval of
a man that would take leave under the FMLA for the birth of a child,
and expressing that one of his co-workers "would get" the plaintiff
upon his return to work, were not enough to support a reasonable
inference that the plaintiff's suspension was in retaliation for taking
leave. 162 The court found that the reason for the discharge, the plain-
tiff's commission of a mathematical mistake, was legitimate given a
three month time span between the plaintiff's return from leave and
the disciplinary action, the plaintiff's receipt of a positive evaluation
after returning from leave, and the fact that other employees were
suspended for the same mistake. 63
The employee's argument of pretext was also rejected by the court
in Rocky v. Columbia Lawnwood Regional Medical Center.164 In
154. No. 97-CV-1607, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18748 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 1999).
155. Id. at *12.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at *13.
160. No. 3:96-CV-3413-R, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1150 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 21, 1998).
161. Id.
162. Id. at *19.
163. Id.
164. 54 F. Supp.2d 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
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Rocky, the employer offered excessive absences and tardiness as its
legitimate reasons for termination. 165 The court found insufficient ev-
idence of pretext, despite the supervisor's statement five months prior
to termination that if plaintiff "did not stop taking time off to care for
her son she would be fired," and "that everyone would like to take
time of [sic] to care for one's family, but that was not acceptable.' ' 166
These "isolated statements" were found to be "too remote and am-
biguous to raise an inference of pretext.' 67
Using similar reasoning, in Kaylor v. Fannin Regional Hospital,168
the court held that there was no evidence that the employer termi-
nated plaintiff's employment because of leave under the FMLA,
where the reason given, "excessive use of sick time," is a standard
generic phrase which could include attempting fraudulent sick
leave.' 69 These cases fail to give credence to the employee's claim of
pretext, even where she has presented direct evidence of the em-
ployer's discriminatory intent.
The application of the McDonnell Douglas balancing test in the
FMLA context has sometimes ignored the fine-tuning of the test
which exists in Title VII discrimination cases, where the employee es-
tablishes that the invocation of her rights under the FMLA played a
motivating part in the employer's decision to take adverse action. In
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,170 the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that where a plaintiff makes such a showing in a Title VII
claim, the employer has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it "would have made the same decision," notwith-
standing the employee's protected conduct or status. 171 If the defen-
dant fails to carry that burden, the plaintiff prevails.172 This alteration
of the McDonnell Douglas test was adopted because "it simply makes
no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the 'true rea-
son,'"' 73 where the employer's decision was the product of a mixture
of legitimate and illegitimate motives.
Similarly, some courts have found a lack of discrimination even
under the Price Waterhouse mixed motive test. Where the mixed mo-
165. Id. at 1171.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. 946 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
169. Id. at 1002.
170. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
171. Id. at 244-45. See also Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999);
Thomas v. Nat'l Football League Players Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 203 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
172. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276.
173. Id. at 247.
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tive test has been applied, these courts have held that a claim of dis-
crimination under the FMLA cannot survive where the plaintiff "fails
to 'introduce direct or circumstantial evidence that the alleged retalia-
tory motive 'actually relate[s] to the question of discrimination in the
particular employment decision[s]" at issue."' 174
Some courts that have applied the analysis to discrimination cases
under the FMLA have recognized that consideration of leave under
the FMLA by the employer precludes summary judgment in its favor.
In Soodman v. Wildman, Harold, Allen & Dixon,175 the court held
that evidence that the plaintiff was terminated because she was on
medical leave was sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
under Price Waterhouse. 76 Similarly, in Neal v. Mulate's of New Orle-
ans, Inc.,' 77 the court found that a statement, indicating that the em-
ployer was not going to pay for the plaintiff's surgery and that the
plaintiff's leave was not going to happen, constituted direct evidence
of discriminatory intent to deny plaintiff's leave. 178 The court then
allowed the jury to weigh the probative value of these statements
against the evidence of the employer's reasons for discharge. 179
In the FMLA context, even the altered form of the McDonnell
Douglas balancing test may be inappropriate. Unlike a mixed motive
Title VII case, in which the employer advances both protected and
unprotected grounds for its action, adverse action based on an em-
ployee's leave and absence from work is not so easily distinguishable.
For example, when the employer advances "excessive absenteeism" as
the reason for its decision to terminate, the trier of fact cannot easily
determine whether that absenteeism includes the employee's exercise
of leave rights under the FMLA. After the employee has filed suit
under the FMLA, the employer can easily claim that the FMLA ab-
sences were not considered, despite the distinct possibility that the
original "absenteeism" reason did include the protected leave.
174. Trujillo-Cummings, 1999 WL 169336, at *5 (quoting Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc*, 164
F.3d 545, 550 (10th Cir. 1999)(Title VII) (quoting Thomas v. National Football League Players
Ass'n, 131 F.3d 198, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1997))).
175. No. 95 C 3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1495 (N.D. 111. Feb. 7, 1997).
176. Id. at *7. Soodman was cited favorably in Zierke v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons, Co., No. 94
C 7593, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12925, (N.D. I11. Aug. 26, 1997), to support the court's finding
that remarks regarding plaintiff's disability satisfied the Price Waterhouse test. Id. at *18.
177. No. 97-3757, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12780 (E.D. La. Aug. 12, 1999).
178. Id. at *10.
179. Id. at *11.
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IV. DISCRIMINATION OPINIONS UNDER THE ADA
Similar to the FMLA, the ADA also provides grounds for a claim of
discrimination by an employee who misses work due to a medical con-
dition. Unlike the FMLA, however, the employee must establish his
ability to perform the work at the time of the challenged adverse ac-
tion. To establish a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff
must show that she is disabled, that she is qualified, and "that the
employer terminated her employment under circumstances which give
rise to an inference that the termination was based on her disabil-
ity."'180 A plaintiff must present "some affirmative evidence that disa-
bility was a determining factor in the employer's decision." 18' Under
the last portion of the test, the employee must show that her disability
played a role in the employer's decision to take the adverse action
against her, and "that it had a determinative effect on the
outcome."
182
Many circuits do not require the plaintiff to establish that her disa-
bility was the sole cause for the adverse employment action. 183 In
McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp.,184 the court concluded that re-
quiring a plaintiff to show that discrimination was the sole factor for
termination would do little to eliminate discrimination. 18 5 In fact,
such a showing would only indulge discrimination. 186 In contrast,
some circuits have required a showing that the employer took an ad-
verse action "solely because of" the employee's disability.1 87 The
stringency of the court's application of this factor particularly affects
disabled employees who are discharged for absenteeism, since absen-
teeism is a legitimate reason for discharge under the ADA.
Where a plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination, the re-
maining question is whether the adverse employment decision was
180. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997). See also Bailey v. Amsted
Industries, Inc., 172 F.3d 1041, 1044 (8th Cir. 1999).
181. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323.
182. Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 501 (3d Cir. 1997).
183. McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp., 99 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Farley
v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1344 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding instruction that
discriminatory grounds must have been "a motivating factor" in taking adverse action); Criado v.
IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998) (awarding damages for adverse action based in
whole or in part on disability).
184. 99 F.3d at 1068 (11th Cir. 1996).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997). See generally Despears v. Milwau-
kee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 1995) (failing to find discrimination where employee's alcohol-
ism was not the sole reason for termination, as employee's decision to drive while under the
influence of alcohol was another factor).
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based solely on the employee's disability. 18 This question, in turn,
depends on whether the employee is otherwise qualified, with or with-
out reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of
the job. 18 9 The plaintiff has the initial burden of proposing an accom-
modation, showing that the accommodation is objectively reasonable
and that the employee would be qualified for the job with the pro-
posed accommodation. 190 The employer has the burden of persuasion
on whether a particular job criterion is necessary, where the plaintiff
claims it is unessential, and whether an accommodation would impose
an undue hardship. 91
Under the ADA, the acceptability of disciplining employees who
are absent because of a disability typically turns on whether that em-
ployee is otherwise qualified and is able to perform the essential func-
tions of her position with or without reasonable accommodation.' 92
The disabled but absent employee cannot establish that she is able to
perform the essential functions of the position if she is unable to re-
port to work. An employee who cannot meet the attendance require-
ments of the job at issue is not a qualified individual under the ADA,
because "a regular and reliable level of attendance is a necessary ele-
ment of most jobs. ' 193 Similarly, in Carr v. Reno,194 the court held
that coming to work regularly was an essential function of the plain-
tiff's position under the ADA.195
The employee's qualification for a position depends on the duties
required of the position. The ADA dictates that "consideration shall
be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are
essential." 196 The courts tend to give deference to this judgment. 197
For example, an employee is not otherwise qualified if she is absent
188. Monette v. EDS Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1180-82 (6th Cir. 1996).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1183-84. See also Willis v. Conopco, Inc., 108 F.3d 282, 285-86 (11th Cir. 1997)
(holding that after plaintiff proves her prima facie case, employer bears the burden of showing
that the specified accommodation is unduly burdensome).
192. Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 1512, 1514 (2d Cir. 1995).
193. Tyndall v. National Educ. Centers, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994).
194. 23 F.3d 525, 530 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
195. Id. See also Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.
1996)(stating that if plaintiff fails to present evidence of duration of impairment, employer is not
required to wait indefinite period); Rogers v. Int'l Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th
Cir. 1996) (finding that physical impairments for short durations are generally not disabilities);
Scheer v. City of Cedar Rapids, 956 F. Supp. 1496, 1502 (N.D. Iowa 1997) (holding that the
employer had no obligation to retain employee's position indefinitely).
196. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (1994), 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1999).
197. Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 57 (1st Cir. 1998); Hollestelle v. Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority, No. 97-1465, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9420, at *9 (4th Cir. 1998).
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when it is an essential function of her job to be in the office regularly,
because she is a necessary member of a team. 198 Similarly, if the em-
ployee is the only person performing a particular function, and the
employer has no other employees available to cover that function,
then regular absences render the employee unqualified. 99
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) consid-
ers three factors in determining whether a job function is essential. 2°
First, the courts should consider whether the position exists to per-
form a particular function.201 If so, then that function should be con-
sidered essential. Second, the number of employees available to
perform a particular job function helps determine whether that func-
tion is essential. If fewer other employees are available, that function
becomes more essential. Third, if greater expertise or skill is required
to perform a function, that function may be considered to be essential.
The EEOC stresses that the determination of whether a function is
essential must be made on a case-by-case basis.202
An employer can more easily rely on a publicized attendance re-
quirement where the employee is important to the employer's produc-
tivity. Strict adherence to an attendance requirement for a disabled
employee is bolstered if the employer has communicated a consistent
attendance requirement for all employees, and the work of the facility
is most successfully accomplished if all employees are present. 20 3 For
example, in Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., Inc.,204 the
court found that an accommodation of arriving after the flexible start
time of 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. was unreasonable, even though plaintiff
worked alone, where the plaintiff required supervision during com-
mon work hours to address problems arising in his work and to ensure
his productivity.20 5
The absent and disabled employee may still successfully argue that
absenteeism does not render her unqualified for certain positions. For
example, in Carlson v. Inacom Corp.,206 the court found that an exec-
utive secretary's average of nine absences per year did not render her
198. Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 727 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that plaintiff's
job was essential for functioning of the team as a whole).
199. Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 826 (N.D. Ind. 1995) (stating that plaintiff's
position was the "linchpin" for the operation).
200. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m) (1999).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Ward v. Massachusetts Health Research Inst., Inc., 48 F. Supp.2d 72, 78-79 (D. Mass.
1999).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 78 & n.5.
206. 885 F. Supp. 1314 (D. Neb. 1995).
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unqualified, because that rate of absenteeism was not excessive.2 0 7
The court held there was no evidence that the employee's absences
resulted in essential business not being completed in a timely and effi-
cient manner, or that her absences either threatened or caused a loss
of business or profits.20 8 The court also considered that, although her
absences may have been disruptive, there was no evidence that they
were "unduly disruptive. '20 9 Similar to the court in Ward,210 the Carl-
son court also considered the employer's lack of a policy on un-
scheduled absenteeism. 211
The employee with a history of absenteeism that prevents her from
performing all the duties of her position can assert that she would be
qualified to perform the essential functions of her position with rea-
sonable accommodation by her employer.212 The ADA's legislative
history, the EEOC interpretive guidelines, and case law make it clear
that one type of reasonable accommodation may be a temporary leave
of absence to obtain necessary medical treatment.213 Temporary leave
can constitute reasonable accommodation if it is likely that the em-
ployee will be able to perform adequately after such leave.2 14 Accom-
modation in the form of leave is particularly reasonable if there is no
evidence of financial hardship, or a lack of ability to cover the dis-
abled employee's work.21 5 In Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen &
Dixon,2 6 the court concluded that, without such evidence, termina-
tion based on the disabled employee's "nonattendance [was] tanta-
mount to the denial of employment" based on the ADA's
requirement that an employer reasonably accommodate an otherwise
qualified individual. 2 7
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1321.
209. Id. (citing Dutton v. Johnson County Bd. Of County Comm'rs, 859 F. Supp. 498, 508 (D.
Kan. 1994)).
210. See supra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
211. Carlson, 885 F. Supp. at 1321.
212. Note that employers are only required to accommodate known disabilities. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(1994). If the employee fails to inform her employer about the disability and her
need for accommodation, even at the time of the adverse action, the employer cannot be held
liable for its failure to accommodate. Carlson, 885 F. Supp. at 1322.
213. H.R. REi,. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 63 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 345; 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1999).
214. Schmidt v. Safeway, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 991, 996-97 (D. Or. 1994).
215. Soodman v. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon, No. 95-C-3834, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
1495, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1997).
216. id.
217. Id.
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The reasonableness of the accommodation typically depends on the
resulting costs and burden on the employer.218 With respect to al-
lowing a period of leave in particular, the courts generally find that
requiring an accommodation of leave for an indefinite period of time
places too great a cost on the employer. 219 For example, the court in
Nowak v. St. Rita High School220 held that a school was not required
to accommodate a teacher's total absence of eighteen months with
additional indefinite leave, where attendance was an essential element
of his job.22 ' Similarly, where an employee's disability makes him un-
able to attend work on a regular basis, he is unqualified for the posi-
tion, and the employer need not accommodate his inability to attend
work regularly. 222
In Myers v. Hose,223 the court found that an employer should not be
required to await the success of an employee's treatment plan which
"could" enable him to work, and the court explained that "[n]othing
in the text of the reasonable accommodation provision requires an
employer to wait an indefinite period for an accommodation to
achieve its intended effect. '224 A reasonable accommodation is one
which "presently, or in the immediate future, enables the employee to
perform the essential functions of the job in question. '225 The em-
ployer cannot be expected to forego providing service to its custom-
ers, or to hire temporary help, while the plaintiff tries to improve his
health. 226
218. Undue hardship is defined in the statute as "an action requiring significant difficulty
or expense," when considered in light of factors including the nature and cost of the accommo-
dation, the overall financial resources of the employer and the number of persons employed,
the type of operation, and the overall impact on the operation of a facility. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(10)(1994).
219. Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 1995)(holding that allowing an employee an
indefinite amount of leave is not reasonable where the employee is a bus driver with diabetes, a
heart condition, diet restrictions, and medications could bring the conditions under control). See
also Rogers, 87 F.3d at 759 (recognizing that nothing in the ADA requires an employer to ac-
commodate an employee with an indefinite leave of absence); Corder v. Lucent Technologies,
Inc., 162 F.3d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1998)(holding that additional leave is an unreasonable accommo-
dation for employee who had taken leave for forty-two weeks in 1991, nineteen weeks in 1992
and nine weeks in 1993); Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir.
1997)(holding additional two months of leave unreasonable for employee who had taken ten
months of leave prior to termination).
220. 142 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1998).
221. Id. at 1003-04.
222. Nesser v. TWA, Inc., 160 F.3d 442, 446 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Micari v. TWA, Inc., 43
F. Supp. 2d 275, 281(E.D.N.Y. 1999)(holding that the employer need not accommodate em-
ployee who works only five out of the last twenty-eight months).
223. 50 F.3d at 278 (4th Cir. 1995).
224. Id. at 283.
225. Id.
226. Id,
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Other courts have likewise deferred to an employer's need for cer-
tainty. In Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,227 the court held
that when a customer service representative was off work for several
months due to a shoulder injury, and the employer had no way of
knowing when or if the employee would be able to return to work, a
requirement to leave a position open indefinitely would "work an un-
due hardship on" the employer.2 28 The court noted that the plaintiff
was not similarly situated to another employee who was entitled to
reinstatement under the FMLA. 229 The court concluded that it was
not an objectively reasonable accommodation for an employer to
keep the plaintiff on unpaid leave indefinitely until another position
opened.230
An indefinite leave is an unreasonable accommodation particularly
where an employer has a policy of limiting leaves of absence to a par-
ticular length of time shorter than the leave sought by the disabled
employee.231 In Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.,232 the court
found that the plaintiff's request for leave was unreasonable when the
total leave would exceed the employer's policy of a one year maxi-
mum for leaves of absence.233
A request for leave might also be considered unreasonable when
the plaintiff fails to give the employer sufficient information. The
courts in both Watkins v. J & S Oil Co., Inc.2 34 and Johnson v. E.A.
Miller, Inc.235 held that an employer need not accommodate a plaintiff
who fails to communicate the definite amount of necessary leave.2 36
In Watkins, the plaintiff could not predict when he would be able to
return to work after heart surgery when his position was filled. 237 In
Johnson, even though the plaintiff claimed that his doctor predicted a
recovery period of one to two months, he failed to provide his em-
ployer with that information.2 38
Some employers have been allowed to evaluate the reliability of the
opinion of its employee's physician to assess whether additional leave
would be an unreasonable accommodation. In Weigel v. Target
227. 90 F.3d 1173 (6th Cir. 1996).
228. Id. at 1186.
229. Id. at 1188.
230. Id. at 1187.
231. Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 1045.
234. 164 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 1998).
235. No. 97-4200, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3002 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1999).
236. Watkins, 164 F.3d at 61; Johnson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3002, at *9.
237. Watkins, 164 F.3d at 61.
238. Johnson, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 3002, at *9.
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Stores,2 39 the court held that the plaintiff failed to show she was a
qualified individual under the ADA, given her ongoing condition of
depression.240 Despite a doctor's statement that there was a "good
chance" that the plaintiff could return to work after a second leave
period, the court found that additional leave was not a reasonable ac-
commodation because the doctor gave no specific reason for his opin-
ion, and the plaintiff had been unable to return at end of the previous
leave period.24
If an employee seeks leave of a more definite duration, the em-
ployer cannot refuse accommodation based on its belief that the em-
ployee may need indefinite leave. In Haschmann v. Time Warner
Entertainment Co.,242 the court held that where the employee re-
quested two to four weeks of leave, the employer had the duty to in-
quire about what accommodation might be needed, or to seek an
independent medical opinion, before refusing to accommodate the
employee based on its assumption that the employee would need
longer or indefinite leave.243 The court also concluded that a short
leave would not impose an undue hardship on the employer since the
plaintiff's position had been vacant for months prior to her hire, and
subordinates handled her work.244 When deciding whether a short
leave was a reasonable accommodation, the Haschman court held
that "[c]onsideration of the degree of excessiveness is a factual issue
well suited to a jury determination. 2 45
A request for additional leave was also considered reasonable in
Rascon v. US West Communications, Inc.,246 as the court held that
granting a request for thirty days leave to an employee who previously
had taken ninety days leave was a reasonable accommodation. 247 The
court relied on the employee's estimation of a need for four months
total leave, and the fact that his actual treatment continued for less
than five months.248 The employer's policies that provided for six
months leave with reinstatement rights and other types of paid and
239. 122 F.3d 461 (7th Cir. 1997).
240. Id. at 469.
241. Id. See also Daddazio v. Katherine Gibbs Sch., Inc., No. 98 Civ. 6861, 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5408, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 1999)(finding that employee who does not return to
work or inform employer that he is ready to do so is not able to perform the functions of the job
because regularly attending work is an essential function of virtually every job).
242. 151 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 1998).
243. Id. at 600-02.
244. Id. at 601-02.
245. Id. at 602.
246. 143 F.3d 1324 (10th Cir. 1998).
247. ld. at 1334.
248. Id.
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unpaid leave also supported the court's holding.249 The fact that the
plaintiff's duties were covered by co-workers, who were part of the
employer's global operation, did not establish that the leave would
have caused the employer undue hardship. 250
When the employee provides the employer with a specific return
date, leave of a longer duration may be a reasonable accommodation.
In Powers v. Polygram Holding, Inc.,251 the court adopted the Rascon
approach when it found that leave of seventeen weeks could be a rea-
sonable accommodation. 252 The plaintiff, who suffered from manic
depression, was dismissed after requesting one additional month of
leave after taking a total of thirteen weeks leave related to his disabil-
ity.253 Although the plaintiff could not be certain of his ability to re-
turn to work after one additional month, the doctor's estimation of his
return to work date was based on the plaintiff's "actual clinical
improvement. "254
Unlike courts that have read the duty to accommodate more nar-
rowly, the Powers court held that, when reviewing a motion for sum-
mary judgment, a court should find that a requested leave of absence
is an unreasonable accommodation only in unusual circumstances. 255
Such circumstances include requests for long leave, sporadic absences
which prevent the employer from knowing when the employee will
report to work, an employee's anticipated lack of qualification after
the leave, or employment intended to perform a task within a specific
period of time.256 Expansion of the definition of unreasonableness, to
include leave without absolute certainty that the employee could re-
turn at its conclusion, would "eviscerate much of the protection af-
forded under the ADA. '25 7
The employer may be required to interact with an employee in re-
sponse to a request for leave to determine whether the employee is
entitled to leave, and if so, to set the conditions and length .of the
leave, in order to accommodate for the disability. In Gilbert v. City of
249. Id. See also Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 441 (1st Cir. 1998)(holding that re-
quested leave was reasonable accommodation where plaintiff provided letter from doctor stating
that she could return to work after next leave); Cehrs v. Northeast Ohio Alzheimer's Research
Ctr.. 155 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 1998)(finding a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether
additional month of leave after eight weeks of leave was reasonable accommodation).
250. Rascon, 143 F.3d at 1335.
251. 40 F. Supp.2d 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
252. Id. at 200-01.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 202.
255. Id. at 201.
256. Id.
257. Powers, 40 F. Supp.2d at 202.
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St. Charles,258 the court upheld an employee's claim of failure to ac-
commodate where the employer offered one week of leave in a "take
it or leave it" proposition, and a reasonable jury could have found that
the employer did not participate in the interactive process in good
faith.25 9
Even if an employee is not on full-time leave, consistent absentee-
ism may render the employee unqualified, even with accommodation
by the employer. In Hilburn v. Murata Electronics North America,
Inc.,260 the court held that the chronic ailments of the plaintiff and her
family, causing absences for long periods, rendered the plaintiff un-
qualified for the position to which she sought a transfer.261 Similarly,
in Hollestelle v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority262 the
court held that since regular and predictable attendance is an essential
function of almost every job, an employer need not accommodate an
employee who was habitually tardy, when other people relied on his
regular attendance to perform their work.263 Where the plaintiff was
late on fifty-five out of sixty-six days, even after his employer delayed
his start time, he was not qualified for his position even with
accommodation.2 64
Employers typically are not expected to allow a disabled employee
to work at home on a consistent basis.265 Working at home is consid-
ered unreasonable when the employee is part of a team and cannot be
supervised regularly at home, and her work productivity would be
substantially reduced by working at home. 266 In appropriate situa-
tions, some courts have held that an employer may be required to
allow an employee to work at home, if the employer fails to show
undue hardship.267
258. No. 96 C 7101, 1999 WL 182151 (N.D. 111. March 24, 1999).
259. Id. at *10.
260. 181 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 1999).
261. Id. at 1231.
262. No. 97-1465, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 9420 (4th Cir. May 8, 1998).
263. Id. at *8-9.
264. Id.
265. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213-14: Smith, 129 F.3d at 867 (6th Cir. 1997): Vande Zande v. State of
Wisconsin, 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995)(providing computer to work at home is unreasonable
request); Law v. United States Postal Service, 852 F.2d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 1988)(per curiam). See
also Cowin v. Lutheran Hospital, No. 1:96 CV 1319, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13385, at *10-11
(N.D. Ohio May 18, 1998)(holding that an employee's request to work at home was unreasona-
ble where the work could not be performed apart from other staff and would require change in
supervision).
266. Tyndall, 31 F.3d at 213-14.
267. Langon v. HHS, 959 F.2d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1992)(finding the employer failed to show
undue hardship by employee with multiple sclerosis performing computer programming work at
home); Carr, 23 F.3d at 530. See also Norris v. Allied-Sysco Food Services, Inc., 948 F. Supp.
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Like the question of qualification, the reasonableness of an em-
ployee's request for accommodation turns, in part, on the employer's
own operations and policies. In Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator of Emer-
son Electric Co.,268 the court found that regular attendance was an
essential function of the plaintiff's position as a tool and die maker,
which facilitated a twenty-four hour per day operation. 269 Specific
policies regarding attendance and warning letters regarding irregular
attendance supported the employer's position that regular and pre-
dictable attendance was an essential function of an employee's posi-
tion in Kinnaman v. Ford Motor Co.270 The employee who is
protected by the ADA can only establish her qualification for a posi-
tion on the employer's terms. Consequently, when the employer
deems that perfect attendance is necessary for the position, the em-
ployee whose condition requires some absences will find it difficult to
establish that she is qualified. 271
The "sometimes-absent employee" will find it even more difficult to
show that she is qualified if she has not notified the employer of her
intention and ability to return to work by the time of the adverse ac-
tion. In Waggoner v. Olin Corp.,272 the court found that the plaintiff
was not qualified to perform the work because of her "excessive er-
ratic absences and other attendance 'occurrences,' such as being tardy
and missing work without notifying anyone that she would be ab-
sent. ' 273 In Murphy v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.,274 the court re-
lied on the Waggoner decision in holding that the employer did not
discriminate by considering that the plaintiff's attendance habits
1418, 1422 (N.D. Cal. 1996)(finding a jury could decide that permitting plaintiff to work at home
was a reasonable accommodation).
268. 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000).
269. Id. at 899-900.
270. 79 F. Supp.2d 1096 (E.D. Mo. 2000).
271. A disabled employee who cannot perform the essential functions of her former position
even with accommodation can still seek accommodation of a transfer to an available reassign-
ment job within the employer's facility. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1161-62,
1165 (10th Cir. 1999); Feliciano v. Rhode Island, 160 F.3d 780, 786-87 (1st Cir. 1998); Barnett v.
U.S. Air, 157 F.3d 744, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1998); Aka v. Washington Hospital Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284,
1301 (D.C. Cir. 1998)(en banc); Aldrich v. Boeing Co., 146 F.3d 1265, 1271 (10th Cir. 1998);
Dalton v. Subaru-lsuzu Automotive, Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 677 (7th Cir. 1998); Gaul v. Lucent Tech-
nologies, Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 578, 580 (3d Cir. 1998); Stone v. City of Mount Vernon, 118 F.3d 92,
100 (2d Cir. 1997); Gile v. United Airlnes, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 498 (7th Cir. 1996); Monette v.
Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187 (6th Cir. 1996); Benson v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112, 1114 (8th Cir. 1995). But see Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir.
1995)(holding that a duty of accommodation does not include providing employee with alterna-
tive employment).
272. 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
273. Id. at 482-84.
274. 176 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 1999).
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would interfere with her performance of the duties of the position she
sought. 27 5
An employer may not be required to accommodate a consistently
absent employee even where the absences are directly related to the
employee's disability which is protected by the ADA. In Palazzolo v.
Galen Hospitals of Texas, Inc. ,276 the court held that habitual tardiness
and absenteeism are not disabilities that require employer accommo-
dation, because forcing an employer to accommodate unpredictable
tardiness or absenteeism is unreasonable, even if it is a direct result of
the employee's disability.277 As the courts held both in Babrowsky v.
New York City Board of Education278 and Rocky v. Columbia
Lawnwood Regional Medical Center,279 the employer does not need to
accommodate an employee's consistent absences where attendance is
an essential function of plaintiff's employment.280
These courts typically accepted the employer's position that contin-
uing to employ a "sometimes absent employee," or an employee on
indefinite long term leave, is always more burdensome to the em-
ployer than replacing that employee. The hardship on employers,
which is imposed by allowing a disabled employee to take leave,
should be analyzed in light of the 1990 Small Business Administration
(SBA) survey which found that the costs of permanently replacing an
employee are significantly greater than the costs of granting a
worker's request for leave. 281 Dismissals resulting from illness, disa-
bility, pregnancy, and childbirth cost employers between $1,131 to
$3,152 per dismissal, whereas granting an employee's request for leave
costs between $.97 and $97.78 per week of leave. 282 The SBA study
found that employers have routinely developed strategies to handle
the work of employees while they are on leave.283
275. Id. at 939.
276. No. 1:96-cv-2550-TWT, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21915 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 25, 1997).
277. Id. See also Gore v. G.T.E. South, 917 F. Supp. 1564, 1572-73 (M.D. Ala. 1996)(finding
that the employer need not accommodate unpredictable absences); Walders v. Garrett, 765 F.
Supp. 303, 313 (E.D. Va. 1991)(finding the employer need not allow employee to work when
feeling well if it would unacceptably reduce efficiency); Santiago v. Temple University, 739 F.
Supp. 974, 979 (E.D. Pa. 1990)(holding that requiring accommodation of unpredictable excessive
absenteeism would be unreasonable).
278. No. 97-CV-874(FB), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14528 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1999).
279. 54 F. Supp.2d 1159 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
280. Babrowsky, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14528, at *13; Rocky, 54 F. Supp.2d at 1166.
281. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 18 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 19 (reporting on a
study conducted by Professors Eileen Trzcinski and William Alpert).
282. Id.
283. Id.
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A similar study conducted in 1992 by the Families and Work Insti-
tute also found that the cost of accommodating an employee's unpaid
leave averaged twenty percent of their annual salary, whereas replac-
ing that employee cost between seventy-five and one hundred and
fifty percent of that same salary. 284 That study also found that sev-
enty-five percent of all supervisors reported that parental leave had a
positive overall effect on the company's business.28 5 A General Ac-
counting Office study likewise found that providing leave imposed a
minimal expense on employers, and that while some inconvenience
resulted, employers experienced significant savings in wages not paid
to the absent employees. 286 These studies suggest that, in general, it is
more costly for an employer to replace an employee than to accom-
modate at least short term leave or periods of absence.
Some positions do lend themselves to a finding that absenteeism
does not render its incumbent unqualified with accommodation. The
regulations for the ADA provide that restructuring a job to accommo-
date the employee's atypical hours of attendance is a reasonable ac-
commodation.2 87 In line with this guidance, in Dutton v. Johnson City
Board of City Commissioners,288 the court held that where the level of
absenteeism is not so severe, the employer must establish that the ac-
commodation would result in essential work not being completed in a
timely manner, or would be unduly disruptive.2 89
Similarly, in Fritz v. Mascotech Auto. Sys. Group,290 the court recog-
nized the possibility of accommodating the "sometimes absent em-
ployee. '291 The court held that where the employer failed to establish
that the nature of the disabled employee's job "flatly precluded the
degree of accommodation that his disability would have required,"
and at least some absences were related to the employee's disability,
questions of fact remained as to whether the employer's reasonable
accommodation could have enabled the plaintiff to satisfy the require-
ments of regular attendance and punctuality.2 92
Even if the absent and disabled employee establishes that she is
otherwise qualified for her position, an employer can still offer her
absenteeism as a legitimate reason for its adverse action under the
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (2000).
288. 859 F. Supp. 498 (D. Kan. 1994).
289. Id. at 508.
290. 914 F. Supp. 1481 (E.D. Mich. 1996).
291. Id. at 1491.
292. Id.
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second step of the McDonnell Douglas test. Absenteeism is a legiti-
mate reason for adverse action against a disabled employee where the
employee's absenteeism impairs, in some significant way, the em-
ployee's ability to perform her job. In Bailey v. Amsted Industries,
Inc.,2 93 the court held that the employer's policy of discharging for
excessive absenteeism, to promote its efficient operations, was a legiti-
mate nondiscriminatory reason for discharge. 294
Similarly, in Morgan v. Hilti, Inc.,295 the court upheld the em-
ployer's justification that the plaintiff's level of unscheduled absentee-
ism was unacceptable and detrimental to its operations.296 Using this
same reasoning, in Murphy v. ITT Educational Services, Inc.,297 the
court upheld the employer's justification for its failure to promote the
plaintiff where her frequent absences, some of which were related to
her disability, might not adjust to the strict requirements of the new
position she sought to gain. 298 As in the analysis of the disabled em-
ployee's qualification for a position and the reasonableness of her re-
quest for accommodation, the legitimacy of the employer's reasons for
its adverse action based on absenteeism, even if related to her disabil-
ity, turns on the employer's own characterization of its performance
needs.
Even if the employer establishes a legitimate reason for taking ad-
verse action against the "sometimes absent" disabled employee, that
employee may still prove discriminatory intent if the employer's rea-
son for the adverse action is pretextual. A plaintiff can establish such
a pretext on a motion for summary judgment based on "evidence suf-
ficient to permit the trier of fact to draw an inference that the prohib-
ited motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment
decision. ' 299 In requesting a review of a jury verdict in favor of the
employee, the employer must establish that no reasonable juror could
have found that discrimination, rather than lack of qualification or un-
due hardship of accommodating the employee's absenteeism, was the
true motivation for his dismissal.30°
Pretext can be established where the employer's reasons for termi-
nation had no basis in fact, did not actually motivate the employer's
293. 172 F.3d 1041 (8th Cir. 1999).
294. Id. at 1045.
295. 108 F.3d 1319 (10th Cir. 1997).
296. Id. at 1324.
297. 176 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 1999).
298. Id. at 939.
299. Burger v. New York Institute of Technology, 94 F.3d 830, 833 (2d Cir. 1996).
300. Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 179 F.3d 929, 937 (D.C. Cir.
1999).
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action, or were insufficient to motivate the employer's action. 30'
When the plaintiff was fired for excessive absenteeism, and his em-
ployer knew that the absences were linked to his disability, excessive
absenteeism was a "pretext or even a proxy for the plaintiff's
disability." 30 2
The employer's own policies may help the employee to establish
pretext. In Kolovos v. Sheahan,30 3 the court found disputed issues of
fact as to whether the employer's denial of a promotion based on the
plaintiff's attendance was a cover for discrimination based on his disa-
bility.30 4 The court accepted the possibility that his discipline for poor
attendance was based on a disability, because the employee's absences
did not exceed a time limit set by the employer and the absences were
excused.305
The court in Barnett v. Revere Smelting & Refining Corp.306 also
made the connection between an employee's absences and his disabil-
ity to recognize the possibility that the discipline was pretextual. 30 7
The court explained that where an employer asserts excessive absen-
teeism as a non-discriminatory justification for an employee's termi-
nation, "that justification cannot analytically be considered apart from
the alleged disability causing the absenteeism. ' 30 8 Thus, the courts in
Hypes, Kolovos, and Barnett allowed a claim for discrimination based
on the obvious connection between absenteeism due to a disability
and the protected disability itself.
Other courts interpreting the ADA have refused to rely on such a
link. The employer's reliance on its policy of limiting unscheduled ab-
sences was not considered to be pretextual in Morgan v. Hilti, Inc. 309
In Morgan, the court relied on the plaintiff's failure to show that
other, non-disabled, employees who took absences similar to her own
were treated differently. 310 The plaintiff will find it difficult to show
that an employer's reason of excessive absenteeism and tardiness is
pretextual where the employer gave numerous warnings for absentee-
ism and tardiness over a six-month period. 311
301. Turner v. Fleming Companies, Inc., No. 98-5065, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 1194, at *16-17
(6th Cir. Jan. 21, 1999).
3(12. Hypes v. First Commerce Corp., 134 F.3d 721, 726 (5th Cir. 1998).
303. No. 97 C 4542, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18821 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 29, 1999).
314. Id. at *25.
305. Id.
3(16. 67 F. Supp.2d 378 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
307. Id. at 392.
318. Id.
3(19. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1324.
310. Id.
311. Rocky, 54 F. Supp.2d at 1169.
[Vol. 50:183
2000] ABSENTEEISM UNDER THE FMLA AND THE ADA 219
V. CONCLUSION
Some courts addressing claims under both the FMLA and the ADA
are beginning to recognize that the employer's discipline for absentee-
ism cannot be easily separated from disciplining an employee for pro-
tected reasons. Unlike typical race or sex discrimination cases, it is
difficult to distinguish the employer's legitimate reason for the dis-
charge, such as unprotected absenteeism, from the protected reasons
of disability and taking leave under the FMLA. If the employer gives
"chronic absenteeism" as the reason for discharge, the court must de-
termine whether that reason included protected conduct by the em-
ployee. Of course, an employer faced with a discrimination claim may
submit that protected reasons were not considered and claim that it
had sufficient legitimate grounds for the discipline. However, courts
should not stop the inquiry there. Under Price Waterhouse v. Hop-
kins,3 12 the courts must go on to consider whether the protected rea-
sons entered into the employer's decision at the time it was made. 313
Only by making such an inquiry can the courts advance the deterrent
purposes of both the FMLA and the ADA.
312. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
313. Id.
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